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Serrano: Its Progeny and Its Prophecy
James T. Flaherty*

N

0COURT DECISIONS SINCE THE Brown' decrees of 1954 have had such
a devastating effect on the educational status quo as has the
California STATE AID PROPERTY Tax decision of Serran.o2 and its
progeny. Here, the California Supreme Court declared that unequal
financing of public schools, based primarily on the local property tax,
is a violation of the equal protection clause in that it "invidiously
discriminates" against the poor.
Serrano was rapidly followed by other cases that covered the
country from west to east (Robinson-New Jersey), 3 and from north

(Van Dusartz-Minnesota) 4 to south (Rodriguez-Texas) 5 all of which
followed and adopted the Serrano theory and decree, and apparently,
had similar pleadings and collaborating counsel. The intermediate
Sweetwater6 case of Wyoming which adopted Serrano was evidently
7
an unexpected bonus.
The "adopted theory" of Serrano starts with the basic situation
of the unequal production of net per pupil spendable revenue produced from local property taxes. The inequality is the result of unequal tax assessment valuations due solely to de facto housing and
commercial property patterns. When the unequal property values
(of school tax districts) are multiplied by the usual millage factor,
the expected result occurs-lower revenue for the poorer districts,
or a higher-millage rate (to compensate) or both. In other words,
"... a tax more, spend less system."

To add to the discrimination problems of the poorer districts is
the state aid which usually takes two forms. One is the flat grant that
goes to every district on a per (student) capita basis, and the other
is the equalizing grant designed to give more aid to the poorer tax
districts. As the cases show, this latter grant, although it produces
spendable income, is generally of little value as to its equalizing
effect.9
*Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
4 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280 (W. D. Tex. 1971)
cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413

(1972).

6 Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
7 Id. at 1238.
8 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 282 (W. D. Tex. 1971),
cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972). Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 876
(D. Minn. 1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
9 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247 (1971) ; Sweetwater County
Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234-, 1237 (Wyo. 1971) ; Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
(Continued on next page)
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It would be complicated to attempt to show the exact comparable date in each of these cases, especially when it is unnecessary.
An example of the basic principle will suffice.
Table I assumes a State with tax districts A, B, and C which
respectively represent a rich district, an average district, and a
poor district. For the example, the millage rate was set at 20 mills
for all, and from there, the table can speak quite effectively.
TABLE I
District
B

C

$60,000

25,000

8,000

20

20

20

c) Realized revenue (a x b)

$ 1,200

500

160

d) State desired level of
per pupil spending

$

800

800

800

e) State maximum support level
(appropriation)

$

400

400

400

f) Uniform flat grant

$

100

100

100

g) Equalizing grant (d-c-f)
(f ± g not to exceed e)

$

0

200

300

1$ 1,300

800

560

A
a) Equalized valuation per pupil
b) Tax rate (mills)

h) Total available per pupil
expenditure (c + f + g)

Although the districts and figures are fictional, they do serve to
illustrate the basic tax principles in each of these cases. The poorer
tax districts, due to lower property (market and taxable) values,
produce lower revenue income per pupil. The state aid may produce
somewhat more income but considering the fact that the local property tax produces about 98% of the local income, 10 which is 52% of
net school revenue (nationally),11 the state aid programs are not
geared to solve the problem. Further, the so called equalization
grants do not "equalize", they merely narrow the gap. In Texas, the
latter aid exaggerates the gap, which may explain the urgency of that
court order.
(Continued from preceding page)
334 F.Supp. 870, 873 (D. Minn. 1971) ; Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.,
337 F.Supp. 280, 282 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
10 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCING,

NATIONAL EDUCATION FINANCE PROJECT,

9

(1971).
11 Id.
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Table II shows the results when the poorer district increased its
local tax efforts by an increase in its millage rate, as shown in line
(b). The rate for A will remain constant, the rate for B is plus 50%,
the rate for C is doubled. Thus:
TABLE II
A

District
B

C

60,000

25,000

8,000

20

30

40

1,200

750

320

d) State desired level of
per pupil spending

800

800

800

e) State maximum support level
(appropriation)

400

400

400

f) Uniform flat grant

100

100

100

0

0

300

1,300

850

720

a) Equalized valuation per pupil
b) Tax rate
c) Realized rate

g) Equalizing grant (d-c-f)
(f + g not to exceed e)
h) Total available per pupil expenditure
(c - f + g)

As the figures show, the increased local effort still produces a
tax more-spend less situation 12 to the detriment of the poorer districts.
All the court decisions that adopted this phrase neglected to point
out that the "tax more", as applied to the taxpayer means primarily
the RATE, not the AMOUNT of tax. Thus, in Table I the (average)
taxpayer in district A pays $1040 (1200-160) more than the (average)
taxpayer in district C. When the district C taxpayer DOUBLES his
RATE, (Table II) the district A taxpayer still pays $880 more (1200320) than the district C taxpayer. Thus, although the district C taxpayer is being taxed at double the rate of district A, he still only
pays about one-fourth as much in taxes.
In all likelihood, the district A taxpayer may have a different
point of view than these courts as to the meaning of "equal protection" once the implementation of these decisions begin to gel. Since
the technique of these decisions was obviously to reach a decision
by reason where possible, and by fiat if necessary, the logic argument of the difference between RATE and AMOUNT would have fallen on deaf ears.
After the findings of the factual situations as represented by
Tables I and II, the courts next proceeded to find these situations
unconstitutional by whatever means possible.
I' Cf. note 8, supra.
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The general procedure is to declare that any classifications based
on wealth are suspect, 13 and cases are cited to show prior decisions
giving relief to indigents and the poor in matters of poll tax, court
transcripts, and legal counsel. 14 The courts must now find that the
education of the youth is in this protectable category, or at least no
compelling state interest for the obvious differences. The latter was
easily found in all these cases. Robinson went so far as to state that
the
...

state and the courts have a special solicitude for the

welfare of children... (they) may become wards of the court
simply to insure that they be provided with proper protection, maintenance, and education ....

Education is not left

to the discretion of the parent ... (and) serves too important
a function to leave it also to the mood-in some cases the low
aspirations--of the taxpayers of a given district.. .15
Having established the de facto inequalities in expenditures, and
the importance of education as an important function of the STATE,
the next step is to find the necessary de jure action.
This was determined by various theories, the most important of
which is called "fiscal neutrality." Without an actual workable definition, Serrano considered a violation of this relatively new theory as
a "funding scheme that invidiously discriminates against the poor
because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the
wealth of his parents and neighbors", 16 found "no compelling state
purpose necessitating this present method of finance," . . . and con17
cluded that it "must fall before the equal protection clause".
To the serious student of the law, this reasoning makes very little
sense, in fact, it is blatantly illogical. However, it is unlikely this
court was going to be overly concerned about legal technicalitiesincluding logic and reason, since the thrust of the case was not
directed to reason but to emotion. These judges saw a fiscal policy
which is appropriate for rural 1920, but totally unsuited for 1970. It
is more than a dinosaur, it is a fiscal monstrosity, so bad that no one
had yet dared to rush in to kill this dragon. The Serrano court ignored
13 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (1971) ; Sweetwater County
Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Wyo. 1971), Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 875 (1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.,
337 F.Supp. 280, 282 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
14 Serrano v. Priest 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1253 (1971) ; Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn. 1971) Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School
Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 292 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).
15 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super 223, 287 A.2d 187, 216 (1972).
16 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1971); cf. Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 875 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413

(1972).
17 Id.
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"the law", and decided to use its power and authority to change a now
bad law. The case spawned progeny even before it had matured.' 8
The rapidity with which the other judges grasped the Serrano
decision as precedent, showed how much emotion was contained in
the outmoded fiscal structure for modern education. Its financial support is based on an already outdated and overburdened local property
tax, coupled with an inadequate and incompetent state aid formula
designed for an early century type of educational structure and
philosophy, and successively confused by political compromise. 19
This impatience was again demonstrated in the judicial disregard
20
(certainly not a misunderstanding) of the de facto-de jure distinction.
The decisions admit, correctly, the de facto situation. Then, they con2 1
clude without more, that the lines were drawn based on wealth.
What lines? Do they seriously suggest that those respective states
actually carved out a series of cities, towns, counties and school districts with wealth as the criteria? What evidence was shown (or, in
fact, could be shown) of such motivation? Is it a fact that the citytown lines in these states were just recently drawn? Or maybe the
city lines "float" as the rich and poor migrate to and from districts.
Of course, these latter suggestions are specious, and used only to
further evidence the emphasis on impatience and reform in these
decisions, rather than THE LAW.
Nowhere was there evidence to show the responsibility of the
states, as a matter of law, to subsidize or equalize local financing.
Public schools have generally been mandated by the State as to their
existence, but fiscal responsibility belongs to the local governmental
units. The aid advanced by the states was more in the nature of gratuitous assistance than a constitutional mandate (i.e., if each state
legislature decided to terminate all state aid, what then?).
Further, the cases indicated that possibility of the inapplicability
of the Fourteenth Amendment if the state aid formula was strictly
Is (In addition to those cited): Troek v. Robinson, No ......... (Mo., filed Nov. 10, 1971)

;
Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. of Arizona, filed Jan. 13, 1972); Pecatello School Dist. No. 25 v. Engelking, No. 47055 (Idaho, filed Oct. 29, 1971);
Ohio Education Assoc. v. Gilligan, No. 71-359 (U.S.D.C. Cincinnati, filed April 1972);
Martwick v. Illinois, Chancery No. 72CH297 (Cook Co., filed May 1972); Rupert
Exton, CV No. 726-742 (U.S.D.C. Neb., filed May 1972).
19 Cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 211 (1972).
20 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 497 P.2d 1241, 1254 (1971); cf. Keyes v School
Dist. No. 1, 313 F.Supp. 61, 74. (D. Col. 1971) ; Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana,
324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963); Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d
55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430, 435 (1968); United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395
U.S. 225, 228 (1969); Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218, 224 (1964); But see: San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson,
92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669, 679 (1971).
21 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (1971); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 285 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413
(1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super 223, 287 A.2d 187, 214 (1972).
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per capita. This however would certainly not satisfy the judges. Although such enactment would be legal, the PROBLEM still remains.
Since "the Constitution" was merely an excuse to reach a solution
to a very bad problem, judicial ingenuity would certainly develop
some new way to circumvent that potential checkmate.
An angry court will easily make statements as "....

(the financing)

invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality
of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors." 22 ; or, ". . . spending per pupil as a function of the school dis-

trict's wealth violates the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States";22 Sweetwater
merely referred to the "inequality" 24 and then admitted it has "been
considerably influenced by . . . Serrano";2 5 Rodriguez believed that
".... (education should not) be a function of the local property tax
base";2 6 or "... (education must be equal), it cannot be financed by

a method that makes a pupil's education depend upon the wealth of
his family and neighbors" 27.
It would be hard to argue with the emotional appeal of these
pronouncements, but difficult to find in these vague philosophical
pronouncements any traditional legal basis except as a preamble to
a law. Courts are more flexible than legislatures. They can make the
vague social pronouncement, and then, by injunction, give it the
force and effect of law. They did.
Having established this new legal principle, the law required a
rationale to justify their decrees. The connection was the "compelling
state interest" or "rational basis".2 8
Once there is a state action which on its face infringes on the constitutional right of an individual, a court will use either the "presumption of validity" test with the burden of proof on the petitioner, or
the "compelling state interest" which puts the burden of proof on
the defendant state. Reason dictates that the individual will pick the
test that assures a pre-determined conclusion. Here, the latter test is
the one that will produce the desired result.
In the application of the newly declared legal principle against
the traditional tests of "compelling state interest" and "rational basis",
the conclusion was never in doubt.
22
23
24
25

Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1971).
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971).
Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Wyo. 1971).
Id. at 1238.

26 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 282 (W. D. Tex.
1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).
27 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 213, 214 (1972).
28 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal Rptr. 601, 604, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1971) ; Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 874 (D. Minn. 1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 214 (1972) ; Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.,
337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).
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To give further rationality to the foregone conclusion, as indicated
above the new legal principle has been propounded: "Wealth as a
suspect classification".2 9
Although the fully homogenized society under big brother may be
visable on the distant horizon, it is still a long way from de facto
wealth distinctions to such differences now being per se suspect as a
matter of law. It should come as a surprise to all persons whose income
is above average, to find that they are now in a de jure "suspect class."
This latter classification was designed for shock value to make
the comparison with the new legal principle more emphatic, and to
make the rendered decree less susceptible to attack by the defendant
State legislators (i.e. what politician could attack home, mom, baseball, apple pie, or invidious discrimination against the poor).
Serrano, and Sweetwater, being decisions of state Supreme Courts,
are in a good position. The decrees are final and not subject to review.
The only problem is legislative implementation. Robinson is more precarious, being the decision of an intermediate state court, whose efforts
could suffer the insult and reversal of its neighbor Spano:
The issue posed by the plaintiffs here, as in Serrano ...

and Van Dusartz (etc.)...

Two recent per curiam decisions

rendered by the U. S. Supreme Court... are controlling . . .
The abiding judicial realities are that these very challenges of unconstitutionality have recently been twice reviewed and rejected by the court. It is not within the competence of a nisi prius state court to presume to explain the
Supreme Court's unexpressed thinking; its conclusions and
holdings are sufficient unto themselves.. . that learned court
does not require pronouncements from intermediary surrogates.
The applicable law is contained in McInnis and Burruss.
If they are no longer to be controlling authorities, their demise should be proclaimed by The U. S. Supreme Court.
Surely decisions so recently rendered should not be deemed
hoary precedents, so attenuated by age as to be no longer
viable-and, indeed, not by Special Term. 30
Van Dusartz and Rodriguez, being decisions of federal district
courts, are also in a precarious position. They have cited a State Court
decision that MADE new law as precedent for their decree, and specifically rejected two United States Supreme Court decisions in point
and contra, Mclnnis31 and Burruss.32
29 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610, 487 P.2d, 1241, 1250 (1971) ; cf. note 13
siupra.
80 Spano v. Board of Educ., 40 U.S.L.W. 2475 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Westchester County

Jan. 21, 1972).
31 Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968); aff'd. mem. sub. nom.; McInnis v. Ogilvie 394 U.S. 322, (1969).
32 Burruss v. Wilkerson, 301 F.Supp. 1237 (W. D. Va. 1968), 310 F.Supp. 572 (W. D.
Va. 1969), aff'd. 397 U.S. 44, (1970).
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In Van Dusartz, the court at least had the courtesy to allege that
it accepted the Serrano
there was a difference in "issues" 33 before
34
theory as being "completely persuasive".
The Rodriguez court took the position that the two Supreme Court
cases are "distinguishable" since Mclnnis relied on "the nebulous concept of 'educational needs' which would have involved the court in the
type of endless research and evaluation for which the judiciary is ill
36
suited", 35 and Burruss relied on the "varying needs" of the students
[agreement, pro arguendo, as to the nominal differences in theories,
does not change the parallel of facts in these cases].
Here, then, is a unique legal development. In 1969, there were
three law review articles describing a theory on a new use for the
Fourteenth amendmentY Next, a 1971 California Supreme Court decree which based its new legal theory on these law review articles,
followed immediately by a federal district court38 that rejected two
U. S. cases in point and adopted the Serrano theory as its own. Then,
another federal court 39 that cited the first two cases as legal precedent! Finally another State Court that cited these three prior cases
40
as valid precedent!
In all likelihood, at least the two federal decrees will be reviewed
by their higher courts. Since the original theories and decrees are
based on emotional mood, the Supreme Court's final position may
similarly be on the basis of "mood" as it was in the historic Brown
decrees, which eventually resulted in the use of federal troops to
enforce the federal district court order against the State Governor
and Legislature.41 It is possible (but improbable) that it could happen
again if the Supreme Court correctly interprets and captures the mood
of the times.
After each court found the present system unconstitutional as
a violation of the equal protection clause, they next went to the
judicial remedy-injunctive relief.
Serrano, in fact, was technically a decision to "overrule the demur42
rers and allow defendants a reasonable time within which to answer."
33 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971).
34 Id.
35 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 283 (W. D. Tex.
1971) ; cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).

30 Id.
37 Introduction, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1067 (1969); Michelman, Forvard: On Protecting the

Poor Through the Fourteenth 11mendment 83 HARv. L. Rv. 7 (1969) ; Coons, Clune,
Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CAuF. L. Ray. 305 (1969).
38 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
39 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280 (W. D. Tex. 1971),
cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).
40 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
41 Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
42 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1267 (1971).
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It did intimate that a more appropriate remedy was a new legislative
a new system which is not violative of equal protection

scheme: "....

of the laws.. ."43 There is little question that this is, for all practical
purposes, a judicial "recommendation" to the legislature to act.
Van Dusartz was, similarly, a technical decision ".... (ordering) the
motions of defendants to dismiss (denied)." It then ". . . retain(ed)

jurisdiction of the case, but will defer further action until after the
current Minnesota Legislative session"."4 Again, an obvious, but still
subtle, judicial HINT to the legislature for some form of legislative
reform that ".

.

. allows free play to local effort and choice, and openly

permits the state to adopt one of the many optional school45 funding
systems which do not violate the equal protection clause".
Sweetwater recommended a state-wide tax basis 46 and even made
some suggestions: "While we do not mean to encroach upon prerogatives of the legislature, we think it might be helpful if we would suggest a passible method by which equal and uniform taxes can be
47
accomplished for school purposes.
Rodriguez was much less subtle, in fact, it was quite blunt. It
ORDERED the "defendants .. . permanently restrained and enjoined
from giving any force and effect to (said) Article 7, § 3 of the Texas
Constitution and the sections of the Texas Education Code relating
to the financing of education . . .".48 It then stayed execution for a

period of two years (to December, 1973) "to afford the defendants
and legislature an opportunity to take all steps reasonably feasible to
make the school system comply with applicable law. .

. ."9

Then to

be sure there was no misunderstanding it added "In the event the
legislature fails to act within the time stated, the Court is authorized
to and will take such further steps as may be necessary to implement
both the purpose and the spirit of this order

. .

. Needless to say, the

Court hopes that this latter action will be unnecessary." 50 No one
could seriously question that this is a judicial mandate. The only
question is how the Texas Legislature will respond to such a mandate.
Finally, Robinson, after declaring the "present system ... unconstitutional", 51 at least made it prospective, and allowed the present
system to "continue in effect unless and until specific operations under
them are enjoined by court." It then stayed, in effect, until January
1, 1974

"...

to allow time for legislative action ..

52

43 Id.

44 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971).
41 Id.
46 Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 4-91 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Wyo. 1971).
4T Id.
48 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. 337 F.Supp. 280, 285 (W. D. Tex. 1971),

ctrt. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).
49 Id. at 286.
50 Id.

51 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (1972).
52 Id.
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All cases are similar in the sense that they have suggested or
recommended legislative reform-or else!
Assuming the legislatures have received the message, it would
be appropriate to conjecture on possible and probable legislative and
popular reaction. To do this, certain assumptions will be made.
First, the local governmental tax districts are suffering from tax
exhaustion-too many taxes, too fast, too much, complicated by a
frustrating inflationary cycle. This condition leads to a sense of despair
and helplessness. They have been convinced they cannot do it alone
anymore-the State MUST help. (This generally would merely be a
change of tax collecting, not true tax relief for the taxpayer. For some
reason, the pain is not as great.)
Second, the local populace is not yet ready to accept the total big
brother-Federal fiscal control of education. It is not so much that
this will not happen, it is rather that this concept is not yet ready for
popular acceptance. Possibly the next generation, after e~perience with
State control, followed eventually by State tax exhaustion, will send
out the relief call to the next higher tax unit, the Federal tax gatherer
and bursar. Then, HEW, like a maiden blushing from the unexpected
question, will reluctantly "consent" to ride to the fiscal rescue. .. and
control.
Third, there is always the possibility that Van Dusartz, Rodriguez
and Robinson will be overruled on an appeal. Even so, it will have little
effect on the Serrano judicial progeny, as they will continue to multiply. [At this writing, cases have been filed in the State Courts of
Arizona, Missouri, Illinois and Idaho, the Ohio and Nebraska Federal
Court, and most likely in other places.] 5 Serrano will neither die nor
fade away. It has performed its very essential function by giving life
to an idea that was overdue for birth. Serrano said "ring out the old,
ring in the new", and the populace was ready. By now, the message
has been received by every State Legislature. The parents of this new
concept need only to maintain pressure. The Legislators must eventually provide some kind of relief.
Finally, it will be assumed that the "golden age" of local fiscal
autonomy in education is apparently over. Phase two will be the State
"golden age," followed, of course, by the Federal "golden age." The
balance of this article will concentrate on the transition from "phase
one" to "phase two".
As to possible courses of legislative action, there appear to be
three obvious generic possibilities.
First, and most obvious, the legislatures can ignore these judicial
mandates. They can assume, for example, that these judges will not
actually enjoin the entire financial operation of the educational sys53 Cf. supra note 18.
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tems and cause financial and educational disaster to the entire educational structure in the state. This appears to be a valid assumption,
unless a judge believes it necessary to kill a patient to cure the disease.
It is more probable that the judges are aware of this possible reaction
to their bluff, but they too, have "two years" to find their "tertia alia".
Further, any such decrees will not be as easy to implement as the
54
Brown decrees by the mere expediency of beckoning federal troops.
Whom are the troops to fight? The Texas Legislature? Will the New
Jersey State Police put the New Jersey legislature under house arrest?
In the event that non-action does occur, it is most likely that it
will be the result of the legislators meeting the same frustration expressed by the judges when they confessed they knew no answer, and
quickly handed the problem to the legislatures. It is unlikely that the
legislators can find a workable solution in only "two years".
It is also unlikely that any inaction will be deliberate. The gravity
of the situation has been dramatically shown, and it will be the very
rare legislator that will not rise to the occasion.
This is probably the real intent behind these dramatic but impractical decisions and decrees.
Second, is the possibility of minimal reform only. This would be
a relatively easy step at the state level. The decrees indicated impatience with the invidious discriminations-thus, the State merely
switches to non-invidious discriminations, or no discriminations at all.
The latter is easy: there will be no state aid at all (unlikely); or state
aid will be on a per pupil (per capita) basis. This rhetoric solves the
equal protection problem but not the real problem. After all the work,
bluff, and risk of these judicial decrees, it is unlikely the legislators
will be allowed to escape so easily, except maybe for the short term
55
in the spirit of Griffin and Green, until judicial patience wears thin.
Since these cases somewhat follow the civil rights-desegregation
cases, it may be expected that many legislators will seek a remedy
that was appropriate for those desegregation cases. It is reasonable
to expect suggestions for school district realignment (from city control
to district or county, or multiple county districts--which may relieve
the pressure, but merely postpone the solution); or bussing on a
grander scale than has ever been attempted before (more money
spent on busses than on education); or even a zoning arrangement to
match all economic, racial, ethnic, and religious interests 56 (such a
zone would, of course, be in the shape of a thin, twisted snake, four
miles long and two yards wide); or pairing, freedom or choice, or
possibly even a voucher system.
54 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
55 Cf. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ; Griffin v. County School
Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
56 Cf. G. LA Nova, EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 87 (1972).
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Certainly, nothing will be wrong with such educational experimentation, 57 but these devices will start out with a poor track record,
and will be a temporary expediency at best, which will only delay
the inevitable. "Inevitable", as used here, means
...

that the level of spending for a child's education may

not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole. For convenience we shall refer to this as the prinneutrality', a reference previously adopted
ciple of 'fiscal
in Serrano. 59
The former (non-invidious discriminations) is more likely to be
acceptable to the judiciary, but more difficult to gain the acceptance
of the voting TAXPAYER. In essence the idea would be to utilize
ONLY the equalization grants. This will be discussed in more detail
later.
The third possibility is complete State control, where the State
would set not only the level of aspiration but the level of spending in
each district according to a student per capita formula, or "as needed"
basis which basically means a higher level of spending for poorer districts and inner city areas.5 9 Assuming the State taxpayers would permit this, it will inevitably mean a boom for the private (and parochial)
schools, as it is highly unlikely that the now educationally underprivileged upper economic classes will tolerate the typical low level
of aspiration mandated by a big brother who traditionally seeks the
60
low level of homogenized mediocrity.
Variations of absolute state control may be shown by utilization
of the data on Table I.
One method available to the State would be to equalize the valuations, line (a), on a statewide level. Then, either district A will have
its valuations equalized at $8,000, or District C will be equalized at
$60,000, or both districts will be equalized at $25,000, with the average
district B.
Obviously there is little value in playing any interesting numbers
game with line (a) (equalized valuations). Solutions at that line
could only cause more trouble than they would solve. A brief contemplation of the implications of any manipulations of the above proposals will show their impracticality. The variation of the millage
only, line (b), as shown by Table II, will produce an increase in available revenue. For the state to meddle here, would require an equal
millage rate, putting it all back to Table I, or an unequal millage rate,
57 U.S. v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225, 234 (1969); Green
v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ; Swan v. Charlotte Mecklenberg School
Dist., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

58 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971). Cf. Rodriguez v.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280, 284 (W. D. Tex 1971), cert. granfed
92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super, 223, 287 A.2d 187, 215
(1972).
59 Cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 213 (1972); McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 332 (N. D. 111. 1968).
*0 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 336 (N. D. Ill. 1968) ; Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
334 F.Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971).
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as shown in Table II, which would then be both state imposed and
invidious to someone else.
The type of unequal equality that would satisfy the courts would
be the reverse of the Table II revision, i.e., district A would be taxed
at 40 mills, and district C at 20. This would produce $1,200 more from
the district A taxpayers than they could use. Since the State is the
new tax collector, it creates no problems for district A as to surplus
funds. The State merely redirects this surplus into districts B and C,
through manipulations of line (g).
Here, everyone is satisfied except the district A taxpayer whose
taxes have just doubled with no direct benefit to him. This is only a
slight problem however, since being a member of a "suspect class", it
may be assumed that his arguments and protests are also suspect.
Even so, it is hardly likely that the State Representatives from these
districts will approve of this type of socialistic homogenization without some kind of struggle.
Lines (a) and (b) do not hold a potential solution. Line (c) is a
mere total. Line (d) is a level of aspiration figure which will be solely
the result of statistical study and political compromise with every
political candidate promising to raise the level much as is done now
with social security benefits. There is no SOLUTION in line (d), only
a guideline, with more political problems and dreams. Line (e) is the
legislators compromise between the level of aspiration (line d) and
ability of a legislator to tread that thin line between legislative ability
to soak the taxpayer but still get re-elected. At best, line (e) is the
vehicle for implementation of a solution, but not a locale for finding
a solution.
Line (f) must be eliminated. All cases agree that this per capita
state action "invidiously discriminates against the poor." As an initial
step in any proposal, line (f) must be reduced to zero.
Since the whole idea is to make line (h) as equal as possible, the
only remaining area available for remedy is line (g), the equalizing
grant.
The most obvious procedure in an equalization remedy is to provide minimum (if any) aid to district A, and maximum aid to district
C. The amount would not necessarily be an amount to bring district
C up to district A's $1,200, but rather, to a level considered adequate
for a basic instruction level-the level of aspiration. This is not inconsistent, as all five of these decisions, with McInnis added for weight,
admit that they do not recommend or require equal per pupil expenditures. 61
61McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 335 (N. D. Ill. 1968) ; Serrano v. Priest, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 314 F.Supp.
870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. 337 F.Supp.
280, 283 (W. D. Tex. 1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill,
118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 213 (1972).
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As a first step, this would appear to be the most practical approach, as it will bring a measure of relief to the local tax districts,
and remove the invidious discriminations. [It will not however bring
relief to the taxpayer.] It will allow the local district the option of
self imposed taxes above the state level of spending to satisfy the local
levels of aspirations above the level of aspiration set by the state.
To be sure, the question of mechanical implementation is relatively easy compared to the legislative problem as to the source of
the extra revenue. But then, there is no reason why this author cannot
be as cavalier as the courts and refer that problem to the legislature,
except to suggest a possible solution would be the application of the
progressive income tax to the real property tax rate, not to assessments.
"The road to fiscal equality in education may be more tortuous
62
than the one that leads toward racial integration in education".
62 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCING,

supra note 10, at 59.
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